

Message Text

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 03527 220939Z

42

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SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO COMMENTS ON INDO-CHINA;
RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND THE U.S.

1. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO, SPEAKING
TO GRADUATING ARMY CADETS APRIL 19 ON THE EVE OF ARRIVAL
IN ISLAMABAD OF CHINESE VICE PREMIER LI HSIEN-NIEN,
COMMENTED ON THE SITUATION IN INDO-CHINA AND PAKISTAN'S
FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL. HE RECOUNTED HOW GOP HAD
CORRECTLY ASSESSED FUTURE POWER RELATIONSHIPS AND HAD SET
ITS POLICY ACCORDINGLY. BECAUSE OF AMERICAN POLICY IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, STRAINS HAD DEVELOPED IN PAK-U.S. RELATIONS,
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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 03527 220939Z

ESPECIALLY IN THE 1960'S. HE PREDICTED THAT THE SITUATION

IN INDO-CHINA WOULD HAVE PROFOUND EFFECTS IN THE REST OF ASIA, UP TO AND INCLUDING NEPAL AND BANGLADESH, BUT

THAT THE "SHADOW" WOULD NOT EXTEND IMMEDIATELY TO JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA. IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD HE FELT THAT A REASSESSMENT OF POLICY WOULD LEAD TO GREATER ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA. THE PM CLAIMED THAT A STRONG GOP DEFENSE CAPABILITY WAS NECESSARY TO DISCOURTAGE ITS NEIGHBORS FROM MILITARY ADVENTURES. END SUMMARY.

2. IN A ONE-HOUR EXTEMPORENEOUS SPEECH AT THE ANNUAL PASSING OUT PARADE AT PAKISTAN'S MILITARY ACADEMY AT KABUL (NEAR ABBOTABAD) ON APRIL 19, BHUTTO CLAIMED THAT GOP HAD PURSUED SUCCESSFUL FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE

YEARS -- POINTING PARTICULARLY TO ITS POLICY TOWARDS INDO-CHINA DURING THE 1960'S WHICH HAD REALISTICALLY ASSESSED CHANGING BALANCE OF FORCES IN ASIA. HE CLAIMED THAT THIS RESULTED IN STRAINS IN PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND RECOUNTED VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S ATTEMPT TO GET THE GOP TO SUPPORT SOUTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT. HUMPHREY, BHUTTO CLAIMED, PLEADED FOR EVEN "SYMBOLIC SUPPORT," SUCH AS OFFER OF SPORTING GOODS. THE GOP REFUSED, HE SAID, ON PRINCIPLE "EVEN THOUGH WE WERE ALLIES AND NOT AGAINST THE U.S." ACCORDING TO MISSION OFFICERS ATTENDING PARADE (NOT MENTIONED IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PRESS), BHUTTO WENT ON TO SAY THAT "PAKISTAN REFUSED TO SEND EVEN PING-PONG BALLS". THEREAFTER THE U.S. CUT OFF AID ALTHOUGH IT WAS GOP "LEGAL RIGHT" TO AID BECAUSE OF ITS ALLIANCES WITH THE U.S. PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, HAS NEVER BASED ITS STRATEGY ON THE PRESUMPTION OF U.S. MANPOWER FOR PAK DEFENSE. WE BELIEVE, HE DECLARED, THAT DEFENSE OF TERRITORY MUST BE DONE BY THE COUNTRY SO THREATENED AND PAKISTAN MUST BE PREPARED TO FIGHT IF IT IS ATTACKED. PM CHARACTERIZED PAK-U.S. RELATIONS AS "CORDIAL."

3. THE PRIME MINISTER PRECEDED THESE REMARKS ON U.S.-GOP RELATIONS BY REFERRING TO GOP BETWEEN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND THE MOOD OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HE SAID LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 03 ISLAMA 03527 220939Z

THAT HE HAD READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE'S REMARKS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES OVER AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE PUBLIC. HOW DID THIS COME ABOUT, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY? THEY WERE ON THE SAME TRACK THROUGH THE YEARS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN, NATO, CENTO AND THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT NOW, DIFFERENCES HAVE ARisen OVER THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF VIETNAM. THE SECRETARY, HE SAID, COMMENTED THAT THE

U.S. CONGRESS AND PEOPLE WERE NOT IN A MOOD TODAY TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENT YIN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ACCORDING TO MISSION OFFICERS, BHUTTO SPECULATED VAGUELY THAT "WHEN SOLID COMMITMENTS BECOME MERELY PIECES OF PAPER WITH SOME SMALL COUNTRY LIKE BANGLADESH, THAT IS ONE THING, BUT IN THE HANDS OF A SUPERPOWER, THAT IS A REAL PROBLEM."

4. ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO PAKISTAN'S NEIGHBORS, BHUTTO CLAIMED THAT UNLIKE THE GOP, INDIA HAD NOT CORRECTLY ASSESSED THE TREND OF HISTORY AND HE PREDICTED THAT THE "SHADOW" OF INDO-CHINA WOULD NOW BE CAST OVER INDIA AND NEPAL AND BANGLADESH. AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INDIA NEEDS PEACE EVEN MORE THAN PAKISTAN DOES, HE CLAIMED. REFERRING TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, HE SAID THAT THE GOI'S FIRST EXPLOSION WAS "MEANT TO INTIMIDATE ITS NEIGHBORS SO THAT IT COULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY." HE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT GOI WAS GOING TO EXPLODE ANOTHER BOMB "SOON" "OUT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FEAR THAT EVENTS IN INDO-CHINA WERE NOT GOING TO STOP THERE." INDIA, BANGLADESH AND AFGHANISTAN WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A "FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF THEIR POLICIES," HE PREDICTED.

5. CLOSER TO HOME, BHUTTO CLAIMED THAT PAKISTAN'S MILITARY PREPAREDNESS WAS "DEFENSIVE", STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER OUR NEIGHBORS FROM UNDERTAKING ANY ADVENTURE OF AGGRESSION AGAINST US...OR TO FORCE US TO KEEP OUR LIPS SEALED AND NOT RAISE OUR VOICE AGAINST THE INJUSTICE OF DENYING THE PEOPLE OF KASHMIR THEIR RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE."

6. BHUTTO REVIEWED GOP RELATIONS WITH CHINA, SOVIET
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PAGE 04 ISLAMA 03527 220939Z

UNION, EUROPE, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS SATISFACTORY, REQUIRING NO CHANGE. REFERRING TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEGOTIATING EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HE SAID THAT THE GOP HAD HOPED FOR SUCCESS. NOW, HE WARNED, ISRAEL SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS ITS LAST CHANCE FOR SURVIVAL AND URGED ISRAEL TO "RECOGNIZE THE PLO'S POSITION." IN A PHILOSOPHICAL ENDING, THE PM SPECULATED THAT THE FUTURE WOULD SEE MANY COUNTRIES REASSESSING THEIR GLOBAL RELATIONSHIPS AND RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT. HE PREDICTED CLOSER SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND AN ABATEMENT OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT.

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